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You go First! – Coordination Problems and the 
Standard of Proof in Inquisitorial Prosecution 
Abstract: 
The prosecution of criminals is costly, and subject to errors. In contrast to adversarial court 
procedures, the prosecutor is regarded as an impartial investigator and aide to the judge in 
inquisitorial justice systems. We show in a sequential prosecution game of a Bayesian court 
that a strategic interaction between these two benevolent enforcement agents exists where 
each player hopes to freeride on the other one´s investigative effort. This gives rise to 
inefficient equilibria with excessive operating and error costs. Moreover, we will 
demonstrate that our results are sensitive to the applied standard of proof and that, more 
disturbingly, the inefficient outcome becomes more probable when the conviction 
threshold is raised. Applying the concept of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, we analyze the 
impact of the standard of proof and other legal policy instruments on type I and type II 
errors and operating costs. 
JEL-Classification:  K14, K41 
 
Keywords:  criminal justice, reasonable doubt, litigation, court errors 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Hannemann, geh du voran!” (engl. ‘Hannemann, you go first’) – a German saying1 
The prosecution of criminals is costly, and potentially erroneous. Given that one´s 
innocence or guilt to a crime is basically private information, authorities may mistakenly 
convict an innocent person or set free the true offenders. It is well-understood that such 
adjudicative errors produce a cost to society (see, e.g., HARRIS 1970, TULLOCK 1994, RIZZOLLI 
2019), and that legal institutions should be designed in a way to minimize error and 
operating costs (see Spier, 2007, pp. 282 for an overview).  
In adversarial (or ‘partisan’) legal systems, the prosecutor and the defendant´s 
advocate are taking opposing sides as they try to reveal no information that weakens the 
own prospect of winning while being tough with the other party. In the words of TIROLE 
and DEWATRIPONT (1999, p. 3), however, “this conflict generates useful information” in 
front of the court and thereby enhances the decision-making of judge or jury. In 
inquisitorial legal systems, the prosecutor is not regarded as an advocate of one specific party 
to the case, but is expected to support the court in its search for the substantive truth (see, 
e.g., GAROUPA 2011). In this perspective, the prosecutor is perceived as an impartial aide 
who runs the investigations (so-called ‘Herrin des Ermittlungsverfahrens’) under the 
supervision of the benevolent judge (see SPIER, 2007, pp. 313). 
                                                 
1 This German saying “Hannemann, you go first” describes a situation where a group of people share a common 
goal, but everybody prefers that one of the others makes the unpleasant first move. 
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 In addition to the adversarial or inquisitorial tradition of prosecution, many 
jurisdictions have established the conviction threshold of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ which 
requires that a defendant can only be convicted as guilty when no reasonable doubts about 
the case remain.2 Evidently, this standard of proof in criminal procedure is more restrictive 
than the ‘more probable than not’-standard often applied for civil law cases (see, e.g., KAYE 
2002). This reflects the widely accepted view that wrongful convictions of innocent 
individuals are regarded as more harmful to society than wrongful acquittals, and thus a 
higher conviction threshold is required to mitigate error costs (for an overview, see 
ANDREONI 1991, and TSUR 2017). 
 In this paper, we will show that the strategic interaction between two benevolent 
enforcement agents, the judge and the prosecutor, still gives rise to inefficient equilibria in 
inquisitorial criminal procedure. Moreover, we will demonstrate that the inefficient 
outcome becomes more probable when the conviction threshold is raised. In the following, 
we develop a sequential prosecution game in which both the prosecutor and the judge could 
perfectly reveal the true guilt of the defendant, but investigations create private effort costs. 
As a consequence, a freeriding dilemma unfolds where each enforcement agent hopes to 
benefit from the other´s investigative effort. Following the formal concept of ‘beyond 
                                                 
2 For example, this high standard of proofs is expressed in Coffin v. US, 156 U.S. 432 (1895) and Woolmington 
v DPP (1935) UKHL 1.  German criminal justice order requires for a conviction the ‘firm belief of the judge’ 
(§ 261 StPO), which is often regarded as being specified by the German High Court ruling to “a usable degree 
of certainty which puts silence to any remaining doubts without fully eliminating them” (BGH 1993, IX ZR 
238/91). 
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reasonable doubt’ by TSUR (2017), we analyze the impact of the standard of proof and other 
legal policy instruments on type I and type II errors and operating costs. 
 This paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 provides the basic framework of the 
model. We then conduct a normative analysis in chapter 3, and identify the equilibria to 
the game in chapter 4. In chapter 5, we discuss different policy instrument. Chapter 6 
concludes. 
2. INQUISITORIAL PROSECUTION MODEL 
Imagine a person, the defendant, who is accused of having committed a crime to society. 
Law demands the guilty defendants to be put to jail while the innocent defendants are to 
be acquitted. Given this setting, consider the criminal justice system as a prosecution game 
with two players, the prosecutor P and the Judge J, who seek to determine the actual guilt 
of the defendant. The defendant can either be guilty (G) or innocent (I), and the ex-ante 
probability of a guilty defendant is defined as  . All this is common knowledge.  
Both players (P and J) may investigate the evidence to the case during the criminal 
proceedings. For simplicity, we assume that the investigative effort perfectly reveals the 
defendant´s guilt or innocence, but induces effort costs Pc  for the prosecutor and Jc  for 
the judge. Due to the superior resources of the prosecutorial office and its closer cooperation 
with the police force, the prosecutor can investigate the case at lower costs compared to the 
judge. Thus, we specify P Jc c . The prosecutor can then either drop the case or charge the 
defendant and move to court. In courtroom, the judge may either investigate the case 
himself, which then leads to a correct decision, or decide about the conviction or acquittal 
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of the defendant without (further) investigations. However, whether the case was actually 
investigated beforehand or simply passed on to the judge remains private information of the 
charging prosecutor. 
The law, and society, demand the avoidance of wrongful convictions (type I error) 
and wrongful acquittals (type II errors). We assume that both players adhere to these goals 
of society. Thus, the judge and the prosecutor receive a disutility of H  if a truly guilty 
defendant is wrongfully set free, and a disutility of H  , with 1  , if an innocent 
defendant is actually put to jail. We thus follow the general notion that most societies 
consider wrongful convictions to be more harmful than wrongful acquittals. With regard 
to the social costs of errors, the exogenous parameter   can be interpreted as the number 
of wrongful acquittals of guilty defendants that can be accepted in order to avoid the 
erroneous conviction of a single innocent person (see TSUR 2017, p. 198). From the 
perspective of society, this parameter thus determines the decision standard of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ in criminal procedure: given the above specified error costs and the 
exogenous probability of guilt, a court will convict the defendant if (1 ) H H      , 
which gives the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’-threshold as 
1

 

 

. 
In addition to these goals of society, the prosecutor further receives a disutility of L  
if she loses ‘her case’ in court. This captures reputational concerns of the prosecutor with 
regard to her peers, future defendants, and her superiors. All players also incur trial costs T  
when the case is brought to court. Overall, judges and prosecutors are assumed to be risk-
neutral, and they maximize their expected utility function. 
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The noncooperative prosecution game consists of three stages as shown in Figure 1: 
The prosecutor´s decision to investigate (stage 1), her decision to bring the case to court 
(stage 2), and the decision by the judge (stage 3). 
 
Figure 1. Inquisitorial prosecution game. 
At the beginning, nature (N) determines the defendant´s true type, be it guilty or 
innocent. At stage 1, the prosecutor may then decide to investigate and learn the true type 
of the defendant with certainty, or she proceeds without any further generation of 
evidence. She may at stage 2 either drop the case, which ends the game, or proceed and 
move to court. At stage 3, the judge does not know whether the prosecutor actually put 
effort into the investigations of the case. The judge may thus either run investigations 
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himself, which perfectly reveals the defendant´s type and leads to a correct decision with 
certainty, or decide about the defendant´s guilt based on his ex-post beliefs. 
3. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
From the perspective of society, the criminal justice system is to minimize error and 
operating costs. Error costs refer to the social loss due to wrongful convictions and 
erroneous acquittals, including the negative impact on deterrence. Operating costs refer to 
all resources consumed for trials and investigative effort in criminal procedures. Overall, 
costly trials should only be held in order to convict the truly guilty defendants. 
Furthermore, any necessary investigations into the case should be run before trial by the 
prosecutor due to her cost advantage and her ability to select cases for court. Dependent on 
the above specified reasonable doubt-bound ( ), we can thus determine when it is socially 
optimal to bring the case to court and when investigations are desirable. 
 Assume that the ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant is rather low and the 
beyond reasonable-doubt-bound is not met, thus    applies. Then, dropping the case 
yields costs H  while prosecutorial investigations  produce costs 2Pc T  , due to fact-
finding costs Pc  and trial costs T  for both judge and prosecutor.
3 Thus, efficiency requires 
such a case to be investigated by the prosecutor if 
2
Pc
H T
  

 holds.  
                                                 
3 Note that a blind charge can never be desirable as the judge would acquit the defendant when the evidence 
is below the conviction threshold. 
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When the reasonable doubt-bond is now met,   , the court is expected to convict 
the defendant. Charging the defendant then produces error and operating costs 
(1 ) 2H T    due to some wrongful convictions and the costs of trial. Alternatively, the 
prosecutor rules out court errors by investigating the case which causes costs of 2Pc T . 
Consequently, investigations of such cases are socially preferable if 1
2
Pc
T H
 

  

 
applies. 
We conclude that for the first-best solution, cases with a rather low probability of 
guilt (i.e., 0     and   ) are to be dropped while cases with overwhelming evidence 
(i.e., 1     and   ) lead to a conviction without further fact-finding effort. All 
remaining cases require investigations by the prosecutorial office.  
4. POSITIVE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we will derive Nash equilibria of the game depicted in Figure 1 and examine 
whether these equilibria are as well Perfect Bayesian equilibria. To find all Nash equilibria, 
we need to set up the strategic form of the game. The strategic form of a game consists of 
the set of players, the set of strategy combinations, and the set of combinations of payoffs 
which the players attach to each strategy combination.  
Player J has three feasible actions at each decision node in his single information set: 
J can investigate the case, thereby reveal the actual type of the defendant, and resolve the 
case according to the collected information. Due to the assumptions made with regard to J’s 
incentives, the ultimate decision under full information is trivial. Moreover, J could convict 
9 
 
or acquit the defendant without first examining the case. Hence, J’s strategy set is {convict, 
acquit, investigate}.  
Player P has four information sets. At P1, she decides whether to investigate or not. 
To investigate the case would reveal the true type of the defendant, in which case P could 
either drop the case (and end the game) or bring charges, handing over the case to J, see P2 
and P4, respectively. If she fails to investigate, she has to make the same decision, but 
without knowledge, at her decision nodes in information set P3. Hence, P’s strategy set is 
the Cartesian product {investigate; not}x{charge; drop}. Obviously, P has 16 strategies. 
Given the specified order of the information sets, one example would be (not, drop, charge, 
drop). This strategy represents the plan to not investigate the case and bring charges (at P3), 
while at P2 and P4 player P would have dropped the case.  
The strategic form could, therefore, be represented by a 16x3 bi-matrix indicating 
the players’ payoffs. However, many cells in this bi-matrix would contain information 
which is redundant. After some eliminations of redundant information and dominated 
strategies (see Annex A1), the reduced strategic form in Figure 2 is an adequate 
representation of the game. The Nash equilibria identified in this reduced strategic form 
describe the Nash equilibria of the extensive form game. For brevity, we use the following 
notation for the described actions investigate (inv), not investigate (n), charge (ch), drop 
(dr), convict (co) and acquit (ac). 
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 Judge 
investigate 
inv 
not, convict 
n, co 
not, acquit 
n, ac 
P
ro
se
cu
to
r 
Investigate 
inv 
-γT-γcJ 
-γT-cp  
-γT 
-γT-cp 
-γ(H+T) 
-γ(H+T)-cp 
not, charge 
n, ch 
-T-cJ 
-T-(1-γ)L 
-T-(1-γ)αH 
-T-(1-γ)αH 
-T-γH 
-T-γH-L 
not, drop 
n, dr 
-γH 
-γH 
-γH 
-γH 
-γH 
-γH 
Figure 2. Reduced payoff matrix. 
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in this game of asymmetric information 
consists of the strategies  ;P Js s , with  ( );( , );( , )Ps inv n ch n dr  and 
 ( );( , );( , )Js inv n co n ac , and the judicial beliefs   about the defendant´s guilt given the 
case is brought to court such that, at any stage of the game, strategies are optimal given the 
beliefs, and the beliefs are obtained from the equilibrium strategies using Bayes´ rule 
(FUDENBERG/TIROLE 1999). 
In this game, six candidates for a PBE in pure strategies exist contingent on the ex-
ante probability of a guilty defendant. In the following, we present the results from low to 
high values of the a priori probability of a guilty defendant, γ.  
For low values of the prior  , one PBE in pure strategies exists in which the 
prosecutor always drops the case and no further investigations into facts are made. Such 
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cases are below the reasonable doubt-threshold for a conviction,   , and guilt of the 
defendant is so unlikely, J
c
H
  , that investigations are not favorable to the judge. 
Proposition 1. The strategies  ( , );( , )n dr n ac  are (i) a Nash Equilibrium which 
constitutes (ii) a PBE if also   , j
c
H
  , P
c
H T
 

 and beliefs [0,1]  apply 
(PBE No.1). 
For intermediate values of the prior  , the game shows up to three candidates for 
PBE in pure strategies. As two of these equilibria can coexist, also one PBE in mixed 
strategies can then be determined. 
The first candidate (PBE No. 2) shows the same outcome as PBE No.1, that is, no 
investigations occur and the prosecutor never charges. This equilibrium applies if for some 
intermediate probabilities of the defendant´s guilt the judge would rationally choose 
investigations while litigation is too costly for the prosecutor. For specific combinations of 
cost parameters ( , , ,P Jc c H T ), the condition 
JP cc
H T H
 

 holds. Given that we generally 
assumed a cost advantage in investigations for the prosecutor, this specific outcome occurs 
only if litigation costs T are relatively high compared to the error costs of wrongful 
acquittals, H. As litigation costs are treated as sunk costs by the judge but not by the 
prosecutor, the judge may decide to investigate the case while the prosecutor is better off 
dropping the charge. Then, PBE No. 2 actually occurs.4 
                                                 
4 Note that PBE No. 2 may not coexist with PBE No.3 and PBE No.4, and thus is irrelevant for any mixed 
strategy equilibrium. 
12 
 
Proposition 2. The strategies  ( , );( )n dr inv  form (i) a Nash Equilibrium if 
pc
H T
  

 and 
T L
H L




 hold. (ii) This equilibrium is a PBE if also j
c
H
  , 
1
jc
H


   and beliefs [0,1]  apply (PBE No.2). 
 For (most)5 intermediate values of the prior  , two PBE coexist in pure 
strategies. In either equilibrium, one player investigates and the other player free-rides. 
From an efficiency perspective, only the equilibrium (PBE 4) where the prosecutor looks 
into the case is efficient, as she bears the lowest fact-finding costs and the same court ruling 
is obtained.  
Proposition 3. The strategies  ( , );( )n ch inv  form (i) a Nash Equilibrium if 
T L
H L




,  P
L T c
L T

 


, J
c
H
  and  J
H c
H




 hold. (ii) This equilibrium is a PBE given 
the belief  |G ch   (PBE No.3). 
Proposition 4. The strategies  ( );( , )inv n co  form (i) a Nash Equilibrium if 
1 P
c
T H
 

  

 and P
c
H T
  

 hold. (ii) This equilibrium is a PBE given the 
belief  | 1G ch   (PBE No.4). 
When those two equilibria in pure strategies coexist, there is also a PBE in mixed 
strategies where the prosecutor and the judge randomize their investigation effort. In this 
case, the prosecutor always drops the case when she learns the defendant to be innocent, 
                                                 
5 For both players, the decision to investigate is contingent on the prior, but each player shows a slightly 
different range of γ in which investigations are desirable. Two PBE (and the mixed strategy solution) exist 
only in this overlap of the established ranges. 
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given she looked into the case, and she charges the defendant otherwise. The judge either 
investigates the case himself and comes to the correct decision, or convicts blindly. 
Proposition 5. Given the two Nash Equilibria in pure strategies   ( , );( )n ch inv  and 
 ( );( , )inv n co  coexist, then there exists a PBE in mixed strategies with P´s 
probability of effort  
 
(1 )
*
(1 )
J
P
J
H c
H c
 

 
 

 
 and J´s probability of effort 
 (1 )
*
(1 ) (1 )
P
J
H T c
H L
 

  
  

  
, and the judicial belief 
(1 )(1 )P


  

  
 
(PBE No.5). 
Assume the above established requirements for the two Nash equilibria in pure 
strategies hold. Then prosecutor can choose her investigative effort in a way to turn the 
judge indifferent between own investigations or blind convictions.6 The judge is indifferent 
when (1 )Jc T H T        holds, which yields the threshold 1
Jc
H


  . Through the 
randomization of her investigative effort, the prosecutor will induce the ex-post probability 
of guilt to equal this threshold. We designate the probability that P investigates as [0,1]P 
. As the prosecutor will always charge when she learns the defendant to be guilty and never 
when she finds the defendant to be innocent, the judge´s posteriori beliefs about the 
probability of a guilty defendant 
(1 )(1 )P


  

  
 thus have to equal the above 
                                                 
6 Note that P cannot make J indifferent between investigations and blind acquittals, because P´s investigative 
efforts leads to dropped cases against innocent defendants, which always increases the probability of a guilty 
defendant γ in the remaining pool of filed cases.  
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mentioned threshold, this 1
(1 )(1 )
J
P
c
H


   
  
  
 holds. Solving for P , the 
prosecutor randomizes his effort with 
 
(1 )
*
(1 )
J
P
J
H c
H c
 

 
 

 
.7 In turn, the judge can make 
the prosecutor indifferent between investigation and blind charge by randomizing his 
judicial investigative effort. We specify the probability that the judge looks into the case 
with [0,1]J  . The prosecutor is thus indifferent when the condition 
   (1 ) (1 ) (1 )P J Jc T L T H T                 holds. This yields 
 (1 )
*
(1 ) (1 )
P
J
H T c
H L
 

  
  

  
 which lies in the interval (0,1).8 
For high values of the ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant and when the prior 
exceeds the reasonable doubt-threshold, then the nature of the PBE depends on whether 
the prosecutor prefers a blind conviction of the defendant to dropping the case. In the 
former case, both players do not investigate the case and all defendants are charged and 
convicted. Given the little gain through investigations when guilt is highly likely and 
beyond the reasonable doubt-threshold, this outcome is also considered efficient. 
Proposition 6.  The strategies  ( , ),( , )n ch n co  form (i) a Nash Equilibrium if 
1 P
c
H T
 

  

, 
(1 )
H T
H






, J
H c
H




  and   . (ii) This solution is a PBE 
for the belief   |G ch   (PBE No.6). 
                                                 
7 The mixed strategy for P is zero if the prior already meets the threshold at which J is indifferent. 
8 The numerator is positive for 1 ( )pc H T     and always smaller than the denominator for 
1 ( )pc T L    , which both holds when the two Nash Equilibria in pure strategies exist. 
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However, the prosecutor may decide to drop the charge although the defendant´s 
guilt is beyond reasonable doubt, which occurs for  
(1 )
H T
H

 


 

. 
Proposition 7. The strategies  ( , );( , )n dr n co  form (i) a Nash Equilibrium if 
(1 )
H T
H






 and  p
c
H T
  

hold. (ii) This equilibrium is a PBE if also   , 
1
jc
H


   and beliefs  | [0,1]G ch  apply (PBE No.7). 
5. FREE-RIDING BEHAVIOR AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The determined PBE show distinct properties with regard to court errors and operating 
costs. From a welfare perspective, two distinct inefficiencies can be identified: first, the 
decision to investigate by the prosecutor is affected by her private costs of trial, but her 
decision does not internalize trial costs for the judge. Consequently, she will charge some 
cases that, from the perspective of society, should be dropped and she will refrain from 
desirable investigations in some other cases. Second, a free-riding dilemma occurs in the 
strategic interaction between the prosecutor and the judge, which leads to inflated 
operating and error costs. Figure 3 provides an overview of error types and social costs of 
the previously established equilibria. 
For low and high values of the probability of a guilty defendant, the equilibrium 
path will be mostly efficient: for low γ, it is socially preferable to drop the case (i.e., PBE 1 
applies). A conviction without further investigations is favorable whenever the ex-ante 
probability of guilt γ is high (i.e., PBE 6 holds). It is well established in the literature (See. 
e.g., SPIER 2007, p. 264-268) that the private and the social incentive to litigate may differ, 
16 
 
and thus may induce the above mentioned inefficiencies at the margin   and  . In the 
following, we shift our focus to inefficiencies caused by the free-riding dilemma between 
the prosecutor and the judge.  
PBE 
Error Costs 
(error type) 
Operating Costs 
Free- 
Riding 
Efficient 
No. 
1 
H  
(type II error) 
0  No 
for 
   
No. 
2 
H  
(type II error) 
0  No yes 
No. 
3 
(1 )L  
(type I error) 
2 JT c  Yes no 
No. 
4 
0 
(none) 
2Pc T  Yes 
for 
   
No. 
5 
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
p J J p
P J
H
L
     
  
    
  
 
(type I/II errors) 
(1 (1 ))(2 )
P P
P J J
c
T c

     
 Yes no 
No. 
6 
(1 ) H   
(type I error) 
2T  No    
No. 
7 
H  
(type II error) 
0  No yes 
Figure 3. Court errors, operating costs, and free-riding. 
 This strategic interaction between the prosecutor and the judge can be described by 
the well-known battle-of-the-sexes dilemma whenever PBE 3 and PBE 4 coexist: even 
though both parties seek a common goal, they conflict over the distribution of the rent. In 
the context of this game, both agents seek to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, but 
they prefer that the other party bears the investigative costs. As we assumed that the 
prosecutor shows lower effort costs, PBE 4 would be socially preferable to judicial 
investigations (PBE 3). PBE 4 is also favorable to the mixed strategy equilibrium (PBE 5) 
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which gives rise to the risk of both types of errors and may also cause redundant 
investigations by both parties. In order to avoid such inefficiencies in inquisitorial 
prosecution systems, it is relevant for policy makers to know how the described free-riding 
dilemma can be dissolved and how PBE 4 can be implemented for intermediate values of γ. 
 We consider the following variables as potential policy instruments and discuss their 
impact on the free-riding problem among the prosecutorial agents: the ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ conviction threshold (
1





), trial costs T, and the reputation loss L for a losing 
prosecutor. 
 The ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ conviction threshold describes the minimal 
requirement for the judge´s ex-post belief about the defendant´s guilt in order to justify a 
conviction. This requirement increases in α, which we interpreted as the number of 
wrongful acquittals that equal the social cost of one wrongful conviction. It follows the 
standard debate in the legal sciences (see, among others, ANDREONI 1991, 
WEINSTEIN/DEWSBURY 2006, TSUR 2017) that α will be higher for more serious punishments. 
Our prosecution game reveals the disturbing finding that α also intensifies the free-riding 
problem in inquisitorial prosecution: First, an increasing α also increases the range where 
PBE 3 and PBE 4, and thus the battle-of-sexes interaction, may occur. 9 For both equilibria, 
the upper boundary with regard to the ex-ante probability of guilt γ is shifted upward if a 
                                                 
9 PBE 3 faces the upper bound of 1 J
c
H


  , with 0





, and PBE 4 is bound by 1 P
c
T H


 

, 
with 0





. 
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higher α (and thus a higher reasonable doubt conviction threshold) applies. This is an 
intuitive result as higher social costs of type I errors require a higher level of certainty about 
the defendant´s guilt, which enlarges the range where investigations are preferable to a 
blind conviction. Second, the error costs of the mixed strategy equilibrium PBE 5 increase 
in α. Higher values of α affect the randomization strategy of the judge and lead c.p. to a 
lower probability of investigation effort (
*
0J





). As the effort of the prosecutor remains 
constant (
*
0P





), this leads to less investigations into the case. As the judge always 
convicts the charged defendant if he did not investigate the case, this unambiguously 
increases the occurrence of wrongful convictions. Both effects show that the ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ conviction threshold directly impacts the free-riding dilemma. More 
precisely, a higher ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ bound, which is usually aligned to the more 
serious crimes, makes the free-riding problem more prominent, gives rise to inefficient 
equilibria and c.p. increases the occurrence of type I errors due to the strategic interaction. 
Policy makers need to be aware that this inefficient free-riding behavior follows the 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ threshold, and cannot be mitigated by higher requirements for a 
conviction. 
 Another potential policy instrument is the design of trial costs. In this sequential 
game, trial costs also affect both players differently, as the prosecutor can evade such costs 
by dropping the charge while trial costs are always sunk for the judge. In fact, an increase 
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in trial costs narrows the range for the inefficient PBE 3.10 At the same time, however, the 
range for the desirable outcome PBE 4, where only the prosecutor investigates the case, is 
shifted upward.11 As a consequence, some cases that were previously investigated by the 
prosecutor will now be dropped as the equilibrium path changes to PBE 1 or PBE 2. In other 
words, the reduction of the potential free-riding problem comes at the cost of more 
wrongful acquittals (type II errors).  
 The third variable of interest is the reputational concern L of the charging 
prosecutor. A prosecutor, who wants to avoid losing a case that she actively chose to bring 
to court, is clearly incentivized to make the correct choice in the first place. As 
investigations into the case are her means to achieve this, strong reputational concerns 
among prosecutors may induce the desired outcome: an increase in reputation loss L 
unambiguously narrows the range of the inefficient PBE 3, 12 but does not affect the desired 
outcome PBE 4. In other words, the prosecutor will investigate more cases for intermediate 
values of the prior γ, which is efficient. However, as long as PBE 3 and PBE 4 still coexist 
for some values of the ex-ante probability of guilt γ, the outcome of the mixed strategy 
equilibrium PBE 5 deteriorates in this range. The higher reputational loss will affect the 
                                                 
10 For the lower boundaries 
T L
H L




 and  P
L T c
L T

 


, 0
T



 applies while the upper boundary 
remains unaffected for changes in T. 
11 Both bounds 1 P
c
T H


 

 and P
c
H T
 

 show 0
T



. 
12 For the lower bounds 
T L
H L




 and P
L T c
L T

 


 , 0
L



 applies while the upper bound is 
unaffected. 
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mixed strategy of the judge and c.p. reduce the probability that the judge investigates the 
case.13 As a consequence, more wrongful convictions occur. We conclude that only for 
strong reputational concerns by prosecutors can the free-riding problem be ruled out. 
Otherwise, there is a trade-off between less free-riding and a higher occurrence of type I 
errors.  
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The criminal justice system is to minimize error and operating costs. Most societies regard 
wrongful convictions (type I errors) as particularly harmful. Institutional safeguards to 
mitigate such error costs include the higher standard of proof of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
and, for inquisitorial legal systems, the competence of judges to actively investigate cases 
themselves.  
In this paper, we show that the higher standard of proof amplifies the coordination 
problem between prosecutors and judges in inquisitorial legal systems. Inquisitorial 
criminal procedures are described as a sequential game between a benevolent prosecutor 
and a judge who seek to convict the guilty and set free the innocent defendants. Both may 
exert private and unobservable effort to learn the defendant´s true guilt or innocence. We 
further assume that the prosecutor can investigate a case at lower costs due to superior 
resources. Efficiency thus requires that the prosecutor investigates a case whenever effort 
and trial costs are lower than the costs of errors.  
                                                 
13 The mixed strategy 
 (1 )
*
(1 ) (1 )
P
J
H T c
H L
 

  
  

  
 shows 
*
0J
L



. 
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 The identified equilibria of the game are mostly efficient for very low or very high 
probabilities of guilt of the defendant. In the former case, the prosecutor drops the charge 
and in the latter case a conviction is obtained without (further) investigations. The positive 
analysis also reveals that for intermediate probabilities of the defendant´s guilt, a freeriding 
dilemma unfolds: both enforcement agents are interested in verifying the case and thus 
making a correct decision, but each player prefers that the other one bears the effort costs. 
In addition to the two Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in pure strategies, where one player 
investigates the case and the other freerides, one equilibrium in mixed strategies exist. For 
this outcome, each player exerts investigative effort with a positive probability, but less than 
one. This generates the risk that either a doubtful criminal case is never investigated but 
concluded by a ‘blind’ conviction or both agents investigate which implies the duplication 
of efforts. Of the three potential outcomes, only the equilibrium where the prosecutor 
investigates the case is efficient. 
  We discuss three policy measures to support the efficient equilibrium:  
First, an increase in the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ threshold both increases the range 
where the freeriding dilemma may occur and reduces the probability of judicial effort in 
the mixed strategy equilibrium. As the probability of prosecutorial effort stays constant, 
overall adjudicative accuracy is thus degraded. Given that a higher standard of proof is 
typically applied when the punishment becomes more serious, then higher punishments go 
along with more wrongful convictions. Policy makers need to be aware that the described 
coordination problem is not mitigated by a higher standard of proof.  
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Second, the costs of trial show an appealing property. Trial costs affect the optimal 
behavior of the prosecutor, but are ignored as sunk costs by the judge. Thus, an increase in 
(common) trial costs c.p. restricts both the prosecutorial decision to bring a case to court 
and her incentive to freeride on the judge´s effort. In other words, the range for the 
inefficient equilibria is reduced at the cost of more wrongful acquittals. 
Third, reputational concerns are considered. If the reputational loss for losing a case 
in courtroom is serious for the prosecutor, then she is incentivized to investigate doubtful 
cases herself and only select probable charges for court. However, as long as the 
coordination problem is not perfectly solved, the number of wrongful convictions may 
actually increase. If the potential reputational damage is sufficiently high, the prosecutor 
will not risk to freeride and only the efficient outcome remains. The impact of such 
reputation concerns, interpreted as a cost when a trial is lost, can to some degree be 
compared to the incentive effect of the British rule of fee-shifting (‘loser-pays-all’-rule).  
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8. ANNEX 
A1 Elimination of redundancies and dominated strategies 
First we discuss the strategies of P which contain “not” to investigate as their first entry:   
•       If P decides, after having not examined the case at P1, to drop the case (at P3), then the 
expected payoffs of both parties amount to –γH each, regardless of what P plans to do at her 
other two decision nodes, and also regardless of J’s plan. Hence, these four strategies of the 
type (not, x, drop, y), where x and y are either drop or charge, can be summarized without 
loss of information to one strategy pattern which we, in the bottom row of figure 2, will 
label “not, drop (n, dr).”  
•       A similar line of argument covers the four strategies in which P plans to hand over the 
case to J without having it examined initially, i.e., when P chooses not to investigate at P1, 
and charge at P3. Regardless of what P plans for her other information sets, the expected 
payoffs of the two players only depend on J’s decision, so four rows of the 16x3 matrix show 
identical entries. Hence, we combine these four strategies of P without loss of information 
into one, labeled “not, charge, (n, ch)” in figure 2 (medium row). 
Finally, we discuss the eight strategies of P that stipulate an investigation at P1. After P has 
investigated the case, the parties’ payoffs do not depend anymore on what P would have 
planned to choose at her information set P3 (the one that is reached after not investigating 
the case). Hence, P has only four relevant types of strategies, depending on the decisions 
made at P2 and P4. The payoffs of those four types of investigation strategies depend on the 
decision of the judge, and are displayed in the table below. The letter x represents the 
possible decisions at P3. To show which investigative strategies are dominated, we added 
the non-investigative strategy type (n, dr) where P does not investigate and always drops 
the case.  
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 J investigates J convicts J acquits 
(inv, ch, x, ch) -cP-T-(1-γ)L -cP-T-(1-γ)αH -cP-T-L-γH 
(inv, ch, x, dr) 
= “(inv)” 
-cP-γT -cP-γT -cP-γT-γL-γH 
(inv, dr, x, ch) -cP-γH-(1-γ)(L+T) -cP-γH-(1-γ)(αH+T) -cP-γH-(1-γ)(L+T) 
(inv, dr, x, dr) -cP-γH -cP-γH -cP-γH 
“(n, dr)” (-γH) (-γH) -γH 
Figure A1. Elimination of dominated strategies. 
Remember that T < H applies. The grey shaded cells identify the best strategy of P for a 
given decision by J. This clearly shows that the six strategies of the types (inv, ch, x, ch), 
(inv, dr, x, ch) and (inv, dr, x, dr) are never optimal for P and thus are always dominated by 
one of the other strategies: either by (inv, ch, x, dr) if the judge investigates himself or 
charges blindly, or simply by the non-investigative strategies of type (n, dr). For the purpose 
of finding Nash equilibria in pure strategies, we can eliminate dominated strategies, since 
they will never be best responses. In figure 2, we thus only keep the strategies (inv, ch, x, 
dr), which for the sake of brevity we label as “investigate (inv)” from here. 
A2 Proofs. 
Proof Proposition 1. (i) If the Judge acquits the defendant, the prosecutor´s best response is 
to save effort and drop the case in the first place. If the prosecutor drops the case, all choices 
of the judge are best responses, given that the case never reaches court. (ii) For (n, dr) being 
a best response of the judge in the subgame where P charges the defendant, J must prefer 
acquittal to conviction which requires (1 )
1
H T H T

   

       

 and J does 
not investigate the case J
J
c
c T H T
H
        . Also for this subgame, P has still to 
prefer not to investigate the case, which requires P
P
c
T c H
H T
       

■ 
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Proof Proposition 2. (i) Given that P drops the case, J is indifferent between his strategies. 
For (n, dr) being the best response to J investigating, first, pH T c      must hold, which 
gives p
c
H T


, and second, (1 )H T L      , which yields 
T L
L H




. (ii) For (inv) 
being a best response of the judge in the subgame where P charges the defendant, J must 
prefer investigation of the case to a blind acquittal, J
J
c
c T H T
H
        , and also 
to a blind conviction, (1 ) 1 JJ
c
c T H T
H
  

         .■ 
Proof Proposition 3. (i) For a blind charge to be optimal for P, this must preferable to 
dropping the case, (1 )
T L
L T H
H L
  

      

, and also preferable to own 
investigations, (1 ) 1 PP
c
L T c T
T L
          

. For investigations to be a best 
response by J to blind charges by P, this must be more favorable than blind acquittals, 
J
J
c
c T H T
H
       , and better than blind convictions, 
(1 ) 1 JJ
c
c T H T
H
  

         . (ii) As P charges all defendants in equilibrium, J 
has to form her beliefs as   , which was considered in (i).■ 
Proof Proposition 4. (i) Given that P only charges the guilty defendants, for J it is always 
optimal to convict all charged defendants without further investigations. Given blind 
convictions by J, investigations are rational for P when 
(1 ) 1 PP
c
c T H T
T H
   

        

 and P
P
c
c T H
H T
       

. (ii) As P 
charges only the guilty defendants, 1   applies, as considered in (i). ■ 
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Proof Proposition 6. (i) Given that J blindly convicts, P will respond with a blind charge if 
(1 ) PH T c T        , which gives 1
pc
H T


 

, and 
(1 )
(1 )
H T
H T H
H

   


      

. J´s best response to a blind charge is a blind 
conviction if (1 ) JH T c T       , which yields 1
JH c
H




  , and 
(1 )
1
H T H T

   

       

.■ 
Proof Proposition 7. (i) Given that P drops the case, J is indifferent between his strategies. 
For (n, dr) being the best response to J convicting blindly, first, pH T c      must hold, 
which gives p
c
H T


, and second, (1 )H T H       , which yields 
( 1)
H T
H






. (ii) 
Blind convictions by J are only sequentially rational if J would prefer this outcome to blind 
acquittals. Thus, (1 )T H T H         must also hold which yields 
1





.  Also, J 
does not investigate the case in this subgame if (1 ) 1 JJ
c
c T H T
H
  

         ■ 
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